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Abstract. Secret sharing schemes create an effective method to safe-
guard a secret by dividing it among several participants. By using hash
functions and the herding hashes technique, we first set up a (t + 1, n)
threshold scheme which is perfect and ideal, and then extend it to schemes
for any general access structure. The schemes can be further set up as
proactive or verifiable if necessary. The setup and recovery of the secret
is efficient due to the fast calculation of the hash function. The proposed
scheme is flexible because of the use of existing hash functions.
Key words: Cryptographic hash function, herding hashes technique,
secret sharing scheme, access structure.
1 Introduction
A secret sharing scheme has a strong motivation on private key protection. Based
on Kerchhoffs’s principle [1], only the private key in an encryption scheme is the
secret and not the encryption method itself. When we examine the problem of
maintaining sensitive information, we will consider two issues: availability and
secrecy. If only one person keeps the entire secret, then there is a risk that the
person might lose the secret or the person might not be available when the secret
is needed. On the other hand the more people who can access the secret, the
higher the chance the secret will be leaked. A secret sharing scheme (hereafter
in this paper might be simply referred to as ‘scheme’) is designed to solve these
issues by splitting a secret into shares and distributing these shares among a
group of participants. The secret can only be recovered when the participants of
an authorized subset join together to combine their shares.
Secret sharing schemes have applications in the areas of security protocols, for
example, database security and multiparty computation (MPC). When a client
wants to have his database outsourced (or so called “Database as a Service”)
to a third party, how to make sensitive information hidden from the server is
a major concern. One common technique is to encrypt the data before storing
it in the server. However, queries to the encrypted database are expensive. [2]
suggested to use a threshold secret sharing scheme to split the data into different
servers as shares to handle data privacy. MPC was first introduced in Yao’s
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seminal two millionaires’s problem [3]. A secure MPC can be defined as n parties
P1, P2, . . . , Pn join together to calculate a joint function f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), where
xi is the private input by Pi, i = 1, . . . , n. After the computation, each Pi will
know the correct result of f but will not know other x’s. Secret sharing schemes
play an important role in secure MPC as secrecy is highly required in such
computations. For more MPC materials please refer to [4].
To summarize, a secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic primitive with
many applications, such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) key recovering, visual
cryptography, threshold cryptography, threshold signature, etc, in addition to
those discussed above.
In this paper, we use the herding hashes technique to design a (t + 1, n)
threshold scheme which is perfect and ideal. Then, we show by examples of a hi-
erarchical threshold scheme and a compartment scheme, that any general access
structure can be realized. The resulting scheme can be further implemented as
proactive easily. By adding an additional hash function we can make it verifiable.
The setup is simple and the secret can be recovered quickly. The implementation
is flexible as we can make use of existing hash functions.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 and Section 3 we review
cryptographic hash functions and secret sharing schemes. Section 4 analyzes the
complexity of the proposed scheme, and shows how to make the implementation
practical. Then, we present several secret sharing scheme setups for illustration.
In Section 5 we outline an implementation plan. In section 6 we conclude the
paper and summarize the advantages of the proposed schemes.
2 Cryptographic hash functions
2.1 Iterative hash functions and multicollisions
A cryptographic hash function H takes an input messageM of arbitrarily length
and outputs a fixed-length string h. The output h is called the hash or message
digest of the message M . It should be fast, preimage, second preimage and
collision resistant. Please refer to the textbooks, such as [5,6], for the details.
An iterative hash function H is basically built from iterations of a com-
pression function C using the Merkle-Damg˚ard construction [7,8]. Briefly, the
construction repeatedly applies the compression function as follows. (a) Pad
the arbitrary length message M into multiple v-bit blocks: m1,m2, . . . ,mb. (b)
Iterate the compression function hi = C(hi−1,mi), where hi and hi−1 are inter-
mediate hashes of u-bit strings, h0 is the initial value (or initial vector) IV, and
i (1 ≤ i ≤ b) is an integer. (c) Output hb as the hash of the message M , i.e.,
H(M) = hb = C(hb−1,mb).
Suppose we apply the birthday attack to get b pairs of blocks (m1,m
′
1), . . . , (mb,m
′
b)
such that
hi = C(hi−1,mi) = C(hi−1,m
′
i), i = 1, . . . , b. (1)
By enumerating all possible combinations of these b-pairs blocks with each pair
containing two choices, we can build up 2b colliding messages as follows (see
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Fig. 1). Since it takes 2u/2 steps for finding one pair of blocks, this process takes
approximately b × 2u/2 steps. So, it is relatively easy to find multi-collisions in
an iterative hash function. Please refer to [6,9] for the details.
Fig. 1. Multicollisions in iterative hash functions.
2.2 Herding and Nostradamus attack
Kelsey and Kohno [10] have a detailed analysis of this attack. Stevens, Lenstra
and Weger [11] applied the technique to predict the winner of the 2008 US
Presidential Elections using a Sony PlayStation 3 in November 2007. We first
build a large set of intermediate hashes at the first level: h11, h12, . . . , h1w. Then
message blocks are generated, so that they are linked and each intermediate hash
at level 1 can reach the final hash, say h. This is called the diamond structure
(see Fig. 2). We claim we can predict that something will happen in the future
by announcing the final hash to the public. When the result is available, we
construct a message as follows:
M = Prefix‖M∗‖Suffix, (2)
where “Prefix” contains the results that we claimed we knew before it happens.
M∗ is a message block which links the “Prefix” to one of the intermediate hashes
at level 1. “Suffix” is the rest of message blocks which linked the M∗ to the final
hash. In the example of Fig. 2, M = Prefix‖M∗‖Suffix, Suffix = m15‖m23‖m32,
and H(M) = h41 = h.
3 Secret sharing schemes
Based on a (t+1, n) threshold scheme, many properties of secret sharing schemes
can be easily demonstrated. It has a simple access structure and basis (Section
3.2). It is perfect and ideal (Section 3.3) and can be further implemented as
proactive (Section 3.4) or verifiable (Section 3.5). Also, the distribution of the
shares and recovery of the secret are through polynomial evaluation and poly-
nomial interpolation, respectively, which are easy to follow.
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Fig. 2. A simplified diamond structure to illustrate Nostradamus attack.
3.1 A (t+ 1, n) threshold scheme
In 1979 Shamir [12] proposed a (t+1, n) threshold scheme, under which each of
the n participants P1, P2, . . . , Pn receives a share of the secret and any group of
t+1 or more participants (t ≤ n− 1) can recover the secret. Any group of fewer
than t + 1 participants cannot recover the secret. The concept used by Shamir
is based on Lagrange polynomial interpolation. We generate a polynomial of
degree at most t over Zq, where q is a large prime number (q > n ≥ t+ 1). The
coefficients, at, . . . , a1 ∈ Zq , are generated randomly and a0 ∈ Zq is the secret.
P (x) = atx
t + at−1x
t−1 + . . .+ a1x
1 + a0 (mod q). (3)
The dealer arbitrarily chooses different xi ∈ Zq − {0}, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, and
stores them in a public area. The corresponding shares P (xi)(mod q) are then
calculated and distributed to the participants privately, so that each participant
gets a share of the secret. By the polynomial interpolation given any t+1 points
the polynomial coefficients can be recovered, hence the constant term a0 which
is the secret. Note that we want the n points to be all different to each other
and the coefficients must be from the field Zq to make sure we can recover the
original polynomial. Here, we don’t want to give out the point P (0), because
P (0) is the secret itself.
3.2 Access structure
Continuing with the construction above, it is reasonable to assume that any
number of greater than t+1 participants can always recover the secret. We call
this property monotone. A group of participants, which can recover the secret
when they join together, is called an authorized subset. In a (t+ 1, n) threshold
scheme, any group of t+1 or more participants forms an authorized subset. On
the other hand, any group of participants that cannot recover the secret is called
an unauthorized subset. An access structure Γ is a set of all authorized subsets.
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Given any access structure Γ , A ∈ Γ is called a minimal authorized subset
if B ( A then B /∈ Γ . We use Γ0, for the basis of Γ , to denote the set of all
minimal authorized subsets of Γ . In a (t + 1, n) threshold scheme, let P be the
set of the participants:
Γ = {A | A ⊆ P and |A| ≥ (t+ 1)}, (4)
Γ0 = {A | A ⊆ P and |A| = (t+ 1)}. (5)
In secret sharing, we first define the access structure. Then, we realize the
access structure by a secret sharing scheme. For instance, Shamir’s (t + 1, n)
threshold scheme realizes the access structure defined in Eq.4.
3.3 Perfect and ideal scheme
Shamir’s scheme does not allow partial information to be given out even up to
t participants joining together [5]. A scheme with such a property is called a
perfect secret sharing scheme. Based on information theory, the length of any
share must be at least as long as the secret itself in order to have perfect secrecy.
The argument for this is that up to t participants have zero information under
the perfect sharing scheme, but when one extra participant joins the group, the
secret can be recovered. That means any participant has his share at least as
long as the secret. If the shares and the secret come from the same domain, we
call it an ideal secret sharing scheme. In this case, the shares and the secret have
the same size.
3.4 Proactive scheme
In a secret sharing scheme, we need to consider the possibility that an active
adversary may find out all the shares in an authorized subset to discover the
secret eventually if he is allowed to have a very long time to gather the necessary
information. In order to prevent this from happening, we refresh and redistribute
new shares to all the participants periodically. After finishing this phase, the
old shares are erased safely. The secret remains unchanged. By doing so, the
information gathered by the adversary between two resets would be useless. In
order to break the system an adversary has to get enough information regarding
the shares within any two periodic resets.
Based on Shamir’s scheme, Herzberg, Jarecki , Krawczyk, and Yung [13]
derived a proactive scheme, which uses the following method to renew the shares.
In addition to P (x) of Eq.3, the dealer generates another polynomial Q(x) of
degree at most t over Zq without the constant term (i.e., b0 = 0),
Q(x) = btx
t + bt−1x
t−1 + . . .+ b1x (mod q), (6)
where b1, . . . , bt ∈ Zq. Then add P (x) and Q(x) together to get the sum R(x) as
R(x) = ctx
t + ct−1x
t−1 + . . .+ c1x+ a0 (mod q), (7)
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where ci = ai + bi (mod q) for i = 1, . . . , t.
The dealer then sends out new shares R(1), R(2), . . . , R(n) to the n par-
ticipants to replace the old shares P (0), P (1), . . . , P (n). It remains a (t + 1, n)
threshold scheme with the same original secret.
The above technique can be extended so that all the participants can engage
in the shares renewal process. This method can eliminate the situation where all
the work is done by the dealer, and the scheme will be more secure.
3.5 Verifiable scheme
In reality, we need to consider the situation that the dealer or some of the
participants might be malicious. In this case, we need to set up a verifiable
secret sharing scheme so that the validity of the shares can be verified. Here we
discuss Feldman’s scheme [14] which is a simple verifiable secret sharing scheme
based on Shamir’s scheme. Also see [15] for another reference.
The idea is to find a cyclic group G of order q where q is a prime. Since it
is cyclic, a generator of G, say g, exists. As other cryptographic protocols, we
assume the parameters of G are carefully chosen so that the discrete logarithm
problem is hard to solve inG. Let p, q be primes such that q divides (p−1), g ∈ Z∗p
of order q. The dealer generates a polynomial P (x) over Zq of degree at most t as
shown in Eq.3, and sends out P (i) to participant i as before. In addition to this,
he also broadcast in a public channel the commitments: gai(mod p), i = 1, . . . , n.
Each participant i will verify if the following equation is true.
gP (i) = (ga0)(ga1)i(ga2)i
2
. . . (gat)i
t
(mod p), i = 1, . . . , n. (8)
Based on the homomorphic properties of the exponentiation, the above con-
dition will hold true if the dealer sends out consistent information. Later, when
the participants return their shares for secret recovering, the dealer can also
verify their shares by the same method. Feldman’s scheme is not perfect since
partial information about the secret, ga0 , is leaked out. However we assume it is
difficult to get the secret a0 from g
a0 if the discrete logarithm problem is hard
to solve under G.
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4.1 Related work
Zheng, Hardjono and Seberry [16] discuss how to reuse shares in a secret sharing
scheme by using the universal hash function. Chum and Zhang [17,18] show
how to apply hash functions to Latin square based secret sharing schemes for
improvements. In this paper, we extend idea of herding and Nostradamus attacks
[10] to any secret sharing scheme. We propose how to speed up the process and
hence make it practical. An outline of the implementation is also suggested.
One direction for research in secret sharing schemes is to reduce the size of the
shares. One approach is to use a ramp scheme [19,20]. However, the limitation
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of a ramp scheme is that it leaks partial information. If we want the scheme to
be perfect as aforementioned, the size of the share should be at least as long
as the size of the secret. It has been shown that there are no ideal schemes for
certain access structures. Please refer to [21,22,23] for examples. That means at
least one participant needs to hold a share whose size is longer than the secret.
Here we want to set up an ideal scheme for any access structure with the aid
of a public area which is justified, because of its relatively low cost to maintain.
As long as no one can change or destroy the public area it will work. To be
explained later, the public area does not help any authorized subset, with just
one participant missing, to recover the secret is easier than an outsider if the
length of the share is the same as that of the hash. From the public area, we
can only identify which group of participants can be joined together to recover
the secret. In general, this is not a problem. In reality, should a secret need to
be accessed, we know who should be contacted. Our scheme is flexible and fast
because it makes use of the properties of the existing hash functions.
4.2 A simplified diamond structure
In the proposed new scheme we set up one message Mpriv for one authorized
subset. After building a diamond structure, all the Mpriv’s will be herded to a
final hash h, which is the secret. That means any authorized subset can recover
the secret by their private shares and the corresponding public information (see
Fig. 3). More details are in the next section.
Fig. 3. Any authorized subset will herd to the final hash, i.e. the secret.
Based on the birthday attack the complexity of building a diamond structure
for our scheme is exponential, too expensive to implement. We will show how
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to avoid such complexity and make the scheme efficient and practical in next
section.
4.3 Newly proposed scheme
A. Setup
(a) We randomly generate a share of the same size as that of the hash to each
participant. Suppose there are n participants, then share si will be assigned to
participant Pi, i = 1, . . . , n.
(b) We determine all the minimal authorized subsets. Suppose we have
A1, . . . , Aw minimal authorized subsets. Each participant holds a share and com-
bination of the shares of any one of these w authorized subsets will form a private
message Mpriv. The combination will be the concatenation of the shares in par-
ticipant sequence. For example, if an authorized subset consists of P1, P3 and
P4, then Mpriv = s1||s3||s4.
(c) Calculate the hashes for the following
H(Mprivi) = hi, i = 1, . . . , w. (9)
Let h be the secret and of the same size of hi. If we want the secret to be
random, we can set h to one of the hi. Or h is a pre-determined fixed secret. We
continue to generate a control ci as follows (here ⊕ is bitwise exclusive OR):
ci = hi ⊕ h, i = 1, . . . , w. (10)
To summarize, after the setup process each participant Pi gets a random
share si, i = 1, . . . , n. Public information ci, where i = 1, . . . , w, is generated.
Control area ci’s help to herd all the intermediate hashes hi’s to the final hash
h. This eliminates the complexity of building a diamond structure.
B. Secret recovering
Suppose authorized subset Ai consists of participants P1, . . . , Pb. Joining to-
gether they can recovery the secret as follows, see Fig. 4.
1) Get the public information ci.
2) H(s1||s2|| . . . ||sb) = hi, and hi ⊕ ci = h.
Fig. 4. Secret recovery by combination of private and public information.
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Fig. 5. Secret recovery for any authorized subset.
This applies to any authorized subset, see Fig. 5.
C. Performance
In the setup step the operations involved are generation of random shares
s1, . . . , sn, calculation of hashes hi = H(Mprivi), and generation of control area
ci, i = 1, 2, . . . , w. In the secret recovering step, assuming participants of autho-
rized subset Ai join together, we just need to calculate the hash (i.e., secret) by
h = H(Mprivi) ⊕ ci. All the operations during the setup and secret recovering
are efficient. This makes the proposed scheme practical.
D. Properties of the proposed scheme
a) Perfect: Based on randomness of a hash function, any participant cannot
figure out any information about the hash from his/her share. Suppose a
participant in a minimal authorized subset is missing, the randomness prop-
erty makes it impossible to recover his/her share directly. Brute force is the
only way to determine the share of the missing participant. However, the rest
of the participants cannot rule out any possibility of the value of the share,
as each guessed value can be combined with their shares come up to a valid
hash. So, in the worst case, they need to try 2|s| times. On the other hand, an
outsider needs to try 2|h| times. If we choose the size of the share s as same as
that of the hash h, any authorized subset with just one participant missing
does not have any additional information to help them do better than any
outsider.
b) Ideal: Each participant holds one share which has the same size of the hash.
The smaller the size of the shares |s|, the more efficient the scheme would be.
However, as discussed above, any authorized subset with just one participant
missing can recover the hash by trying at most 2|s| times. That means they
can break the system more easily than an outsider if |s| is smaller than |h|.
On the other hand, it will not increase the security level by setting |s| larger
than |h|. By brute force, any outsider can try at most 2|h| times to recover
the secret.
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c) Fast setup and recovery of the secret: The calculation of hash function is
fast. No complicated or intensive computation, such as polynomial evalua-
tion/interpolation, is needed.
d) Application of minimal authorized subset: As we explained earlier, we can
speed up the whole process by considering the minimal authorized subset
only.
e) General access structure: As we shall see in the following examples, this ap-
proach can be extended to any general access structure.
f) Flexible: A hash function can handle any message of arbitrary length so there
is no limit to the number of participants. We can always change to a new and
better hash function should it become available. For example, we use SHA-2
now, when SHA-3 is available we can switch to it.
g) No special hardware or software is required: For example, no need to handle
a large number or find a large prime, etc.
4.4 Set up an ideal perfect (t+ 1, n) threshold scheme
As we mentioned before, a (t+1, n) threshold scheme has a simple access struc-
ture. Based on the monotone property, we only need to consider N = C(n, t+1)
minimal authorized subset only. Here,
N = C(n, t+ 1) =
n!
(t+ 1)!(n− t− 1)!
. (11)
Example: A (2, 3) threshold scheme
Let s1, s2, and s3 be shares of participants P1, P2, and P3, respectively. Then,
the access structure consists of three (N = 3 by the Eq.11) minimal authorized
subsets A1, A2 and A3. The controls c1, c2, c3 will be stored in the public area,
see Fig. 6.
a) A1 : {P1, P2} s1||s2; c1
b) A2 : {P1, P3} s1||s3; c2
c) A3 : {P2, P3} s2||s3; c3
4.5 Set up an ideal perfect scheme for general access structure
Our herding hashes technique discussed above can be used to set up a secret
sharing scheme for any general access structure. Here, we illustrate a hierarchical
threshold scheme and a compartment scheme as follows.
Hierarchical threshold scheme The following is the conjunctive hierarchical
scheme proposed by Tassa [24]. Let U be the set of n participants. U is divided
into m levels:
U = U1 ∪ U2 ∪ . . . ∪ Um and Ui ∩ Uj = 0, ∀i, j : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m. (12)
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Fig. 6. A (2, 3) threshold scheme example.
Instead of just assigning a threshold number k as a regular secret sharing
scheme, a set of numbers k = {k1, . . . , km} in a strictly increasing order is set
up: 0 < k1 < k2 < . . . < km. Then, the (k, n) hierarchical threshold access
structure is:
T = {V ⊂ U | |V ∩ (U1 ∪ . . . ∪ Ui)| ≥ ki, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}. (13)
So if V is an authorized subset, then:
the number of participants in V at level 1 ≥ k1
AND the number of participants in V at level 1, 2 ≥ k2
AND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
AND the number of participants in V at level 1, . . . ,m ≥ km.
If we just require any one of the above conditions to be true at any level,
we can simply change AND to OR, then, we will get a disjunctive hierarchical
secret sharing scheme which is originally proposed by Simmons [25].
Example: Conjunctive hierarchical secret sharing scheme
Let U = {P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6} be the set of the participants. There are three
levels, U1 = {P1, P2} for level 1, U2 = {P3, P4} for level 2, U3 = {P5, P6} for
level 3, and {k1, k2, k3} = {1, 2, 3}. Based on Γ0, the set of minimal authorized
subsets, we have the following setup, where si is the corresponding share for Pi
and ci’s are the corresponding public information, Ai’s are authorized subsets.
a) A1 : {P1, P3, P5} s1||s3||s5; c1
b) A2 : {P1, P3, P6} s1||s3||s6; c2
c) A3 : {P1, P4, P5} s1||s4||s5; c3
d) A4 : {P1, P4, P6} s1||s4||s6; c4
e) A5 : {P1, P3, P4} s1||s3||s4; c5
f) A6 : {P2, P3, P5} s2||s3||s5; c6
g) A7 : {P2, P3, P6} s2||s3||s6; c7
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h) A8 : {P2, P4, P5} s2||s4||s5; c8
i) A9 : {P2, P4, P6} s2||s4||s6; c9
j) A10 : {P2, P3, P4} s2||s3||s4; c10
k) A11 : {P1, P2, P3} s1||s2||s3; c11
l) A12 : {P1, P2, P4} s1||s2||s4; c12
m) A13 : {P1, P2, P5} s1||s2||s5; c13
n) A14 : {P1, P2, P6} s1||s2||s6; c14
Compartment scheme Compartment scheme [25] works as follows. Let U be
the set of n participants, and U is divided into m compartments: U = U1 ∪U2 ∪
. . . ∪ Um and Ui ∩ Uj = 0 for all i, j : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m.
There is a threshold assigned to each group, say t1 for U1, t2 for U2, etc. An
authorized subset will:
a) contain at least ti participants in Ui (an individual threshold scheme for group
Ui);
b) contain at least t participants (an overall threshold scheme).
Example: Compartment secret sharing scheme
Let U = {P1, P2, . . . , P6} be the set of the participants, three compartments
U1 = {P1, P2}, U2 = {P3, P4} and U3 = {P5, P6}. We want at least 1 participant
from each compartment and 4 participants overall. Once we determine the Γ0,
the implementation will be straightforward.
a) A1 : {P1, P2, P3, P5} s1||s2||s3||s5; c1
b) A2 : {P1, P2, P3, P6} s1||s2||s3||s6; c2
c) A3 : {P1, P2, P4, P5} s1||s2||s4||s5; c3
d) A4 : {P1, P2, P4, P6} s1||s2||s4||s6; c4
e) A5 : {P1, P3, P4, P5} s1||s3||s4||s5; c5
f) A6 : {P1, P3, P4, P6} s1||s3||s4||s6; c6
g) A7 : {P2, P3, P4, P5} s2||s3||s4||s5; c7
h) A8 : {P2, P3, P4, P6} s2||s3||s4||s6; c8
i) A9 : {P1, P3, P5, P6} s1||s3||s5||s6; c9
j) A10 : {P1, P4, P5, P6} s1||s4||s5||s6; c10
k) A11 : {P2, P3, P5, P6} s2||s3||s5||s6; c11
l) A12 : {P2, P4, P5, P6} s2||s4||s5||s6; c12
4.6 Set up a verifiable scheme for general access structure
Let f, g be cryptographic hash functions. The dealer generates shares s1, s2, . . . ,
and distributes each share to each participant and then publishes the hashes (by
hash function g) of each share as commitments: g1, g2, . . .. Participant i verifies
his or her share by checking if g(mi) = gi holds. If all participants confirm that
taking his or her share as input to the hash function g, he or she gets the hash
value equal to one of the commitments published by the dealer, we conclude the
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dealer sends out consistent shares. Likewise, when the participants return their
shares, the dealer can verify in the same way.
Hash function g is used to make the scheme verifiable. Hash function f is
used as H in 4.3 for the scheme. Partial information was given out here, however,
if g is preimage resistant, it would be infeasible to find the original share si
from gi. Participant i can fool the party if he or she can find s
′
i such that
g(si) = g(s
′
i) = gi. However, this is also extremely difficult to achieve if g is
second preimage resistant.
4.7 Set up a proactive scheme
We pick up any authorized subset to recover the secret h, then repeat the pro-
cess to generate and re-distribute new shares s′1, s
′
2, . . .. Based on the secret h
and the newly generated shares s′1, s
′
2, . . ., we determine and update the new
public control information c′1, c
′
2, . . .. Finally we delete the secret h. So shares
are refreshed and the secret remains unchanged.
5 Implementation plan
Suppose there are n participants P1, . . . , Pn and w minimal authorized subsets
A1, . . . , Aw for a given access structure. Let H be the hash function for the im-
plementation. The secret stores in a variable h, which has the same size as the
output hash of H .
(a) If the secret is fixed, input and store it in h. Otherwise skip this step.
(b) FOR i = 1, . . . , n
Generate randomly si for Pi
ENDFOR
(c) FOR i = 1, . . . , w
Construct Mprivi based on shares of participants in Ai in participant
sequence
hi = H(Mprivi)
If i = 1 and h is empty, then h = h1 /* If no input secret, set the
secret to the first randomly generated intermediate hash h1. */
ci = hi ⊕ h
Ki = concatenation of the ordered indices of participants in Ai
Write ci in public area based on key Ki
ENDFOR
(d) FOR i = 1, . . . , n
Send si to Pi privately
ENDFOR
14 Hash function based secret sharing scheme designs
(e) Delete all si (shares) and the h (secret).
After the implementation:
1) We create the following (see Fig. 7)
i) private shares for participants: s1, . . . , sn.
ii) public information c1, . . . , cw.
2) Any authorized subset Ai can form key Ki to get the corresponding ci to
recover the secret (see 4.3B).
Fig. 7. Shares for participants and public area.
6 Conclusion
This paper shows how to design various secret sharing schemes based on cryp-
tographic hash functions so that any general access structure can be realized as
perfect and ideal. The implementation is simple and efficient as we make use of
the existing hash functions. The share distribution and secret recovery can be
done quickly due to fast calculation of hash functions. We can further implement
these schemes as proactive and, or verifiable if required.
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